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Although the safety of castaway sailors was used to publically justify interventions such as 
Commodore Perry’s arrival in Tokyo Bay in 1852 or the Japanese invasion of Formosa in 1874, the 
historiography of this period has searched for alternative explanations, such as commercial 
expansion or cultural chauvinism. This paper argues that the protection of castaways was more than 
a pretext for overseas military actions. Shipwrecks were a formidable problem of international 
relations in the period, demanding the creation of shared norms and mechanisms. In East Asia, 
European interlopers encountered a pre-existing system dedicated to regulating this problem that 
differed from their own.Although both systems protected shipwrecked sailors, they were in reality 
based on very different assumptions. Westerners made a conscious decision to subvert these 
indigenous institutions, even while benefiting from them. Ultimately, this struggle over the 
treatment and repatriation of shipwrecked sailors can be seen as a key component of imperialism.   
Keywords: castaways, shipwrecks, imperialism, intervention, tributary system 
Introduction  
 In the nineteenth century, the safety of shipwrecked sailors justified interventions against 
indigenous polities throughout the Asia-Pacific. One of the better known incidents is Commodore 
Perry’s arrival in Tokyo Bay in 1852. Although violence did not transpire, it was certainly anticipated 
by the American squadron. On their final approach to Japan, American sailors and marines had 
extensivelydrilled with their cannons and small arms and prepared their ships for combat.1President 
Fillmore’s letter delivered to authorities on shore explained the fleet’s mission as seeking “friendship, 
commerce, a supply of coal and provisions, and protection for our shipwrecked people.”2The 
resulting treaty has been described as a “modestly enhanced shipwreck convention.”3Perry’s forcible 
opening of Japan may have been the most successfulintervention but it was not the only one. The 
Low-Rodgersexpedition, a violent and abortive attempt to open Korea in 1871, was closely modelled 
on Perry’s expedition whereas Commodore Shufeldt’s more successful bid in 1880 alsosought to 
protect the victims of shipwreck.4Formosa, meanwhile, was the object of several British and 
                                                          
1
Spalding, The Japan Expedition, 130–1. 
2
The President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan in Pierce and Perry, Correspondence Relative to the 
Naval Expedition to Japan, 10. 
3
Cohen, East Asia at the Center, 263. 
4
Murray, “Seward’s True Folly,” 44; In fact, Shufeldt even made protecting castaways a higher priority than 




American annexation schemes during this period, many of which were justified by the need to 
protected castaways.5 
Yet, scholars have persistently searched for alternativeexplanations for these interventions. 
Dodge admits that shipwrecked sailors were an issue for policymakers but places Perry’s expedition 
in the context of “commercial, religious, economic, and even patriotic pressures.”6Smith agrees with 
this approach but probes deeper to reveal the “scientific basis of America's questfor informal, 
commercial empire.”7More recent scholarship has followed in a similar vein. For Jeffrey Keith, Perry’s 
squadron was on a racist and chauvinistic mission to civilize Japan throughthe introduction of 
commerce, Christianity, and republicanism.8Gordon Chang, likewise, maintains that racial and 
cultural attitudes shapedthe American expedition to Korea in 1871.9For that matter,Austin’sstudy of 
Japan’s diplomatic relations with America and Europe in the late nineteenth centurydoes not touch 
on the issue of shipwreck or castaways at all.10  
This paper, on the contrary, argues that shipwrecks need to be understood as an ongoing 
problem of international relations in the period. This problem operated at two levels. Most broadly, 
the protection of shipwrecked sailors and property was directly related to the maintenance of the 
maritime networks that sustained nineteenth century imperialism in Asia. More specifically, 
however, castaways were a source of ideological friction. Despite their rhetoric, European and 
American ships were not operating in a lawless region. Chosun Korea, Qing China, and Tokugawa 
Japan had evolved their own institutions for repatriating foreign castaways. This East Asian system 
was quite sophisticated and flexible but it clashed with Western practices and norms. Although both 
systems protected shipwrecked sailors, they were based on very different assumptions. Thus, the 
castaway issue was more divisive than hitherto acknowledged. Westerners made a conscious 
decision to subvert these indigenous institutions, even while benefiting from them. Perry’s opening 
of Japan was but the latest in a long series of such attempts.  
Although this paper seeks to re-center the issue of castaway sailors, it does not argue that 
establishing commercial relationships, sources of coal, or Christianity were not factors. It is obvious 
that these interventions were never only about castaways. Just as the protection of human rights is 
not the only reason for armed interventions in today’s international society, so too was the 
normative desire to protect shipwrecked sailors constantly intersected by economic, cultural, and 
political concerns. Nevertheless,this paper brings castaways back into consideration by showing that 
the protection of shipwreck survivors was never simply a pretext. Contemporary naval officers and 
merchants took the issue seriously.Indeed, one might even say that it was at the very heart of the 
imperial project. 
Shipwrecks as a Problem in International Politics 
Shipwrecks have long exerted a powerful influence on international relations. Most critical 
has been the sudden loss of power projection forces, such as the horrendous losses inflicted on the 
Spanish Armada in 1588. However, this paper goes beyond the immediate loss of lives, hulls, and 
cargoes and looks closer at the political problem posed by international shipwrecks. When European 
ships and their survivors washed up on the foreign shores, it automatically triggered a series of 
interactions with local rulers—possibly benefiting or destabilizing them in the process. The problem 
                                                          
5
Gordon, “Taiwan and the Limits of British Power, 1868,” 225; Cox, “Harbingers of Change,” 177. 
6
Dodge, Islands and Empires, 303. 
7
Geoffrey Sutton Smith, “The Navy Before Darwinism,” 55. 
8
Keith, “Civilization, Race, and the Japan Expedition’s Cultural Diplomacy, 1853–1854,” 181, 202. 
9
Chang, “Whose ‘Barbarism’?,” 1334, 1362. 
10




of international shipwrecks could never be avoided—Terence Grocott has estimated that from 1793 
to 1815 alone there were as many as 2000 European shipwrecks a year11—but it could be managed. 
In regions of the world with extensive maritime commerce, rule-based behaviour and norm creation 
served to mitigate many of the destabilizing consequences of shipwrecks. This process was complex 
and frequently contested by different stakeholders.Melikan has shown how laws regarding 
shipwrecked property in medieval Europe reflected the competing domestic interest groups 
including shippers, carriers, salvors, landowners, and the civil government.12On the continent, laws 
tended to favour commercial interests whereas in England, feudal landowning interests survived 
much longer.13While rule-based behaviour regarding shipwrecks was coalescing within countries, 
bilateral agreements helped establish similar norms between countries. An example of this was the 
Venetian-Seljuk Treaty of 1220 which specified that both parties would refrain from plundering each 
other’s distressed ships.14 
Indeed, it is very important to emphasize that these shipwreck normswere an evolutionary 
process. Written laws, legal precedents, and customary practices regarding the disposition of 
shipwrecked property and castaway sailors continued to accrue over the centuries.The second 
element we need to emphasize is that shipwreck norms from one culture often collided with 
another.Although all maritime regionsresponded to the need to come up with mechanisms for 
dealing with international shipwrecks, it did not mean their rules were the same. For example, as 
Europeans penetrated the Indian Ocean in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Europeans 
encountered an “independent State system with well-developed rules of inter-State 
conduct.”15Often Eurpean interloperslearned about differences in local shipwreck norms the hard 
way. An example of this was the loss of the French ship Corbinin the Maldives in 1602. The crew of 
the stricken ship made a fatal mistake when they saved large quantities of silver from their ship and 
secretly buried it. While this desire to preserve their property may have made sense to them, for the 
local ruler it was a grievous violation of his rights. In the Maldives, a wrecked ship and its cargo 
belonged to the sultan.The Frenchmen were imprisoned and severely interrogated. Francois Pyrard, 
one of the survivors, ruefully observed that they would probably have been repatriated at the ruler’s 
expense if they had not been caught trying to salvage from the wreck.16He also reported that this 
norm of shipwreck was observed elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, except at Calicut.17 
 
Disasters like this taughtEuropean sailors the importance of learning aboutlocal norms of 
behavior. Pyrard’s book, it should be remembered, was not published simply as history but as a 
guidebook for helping his countrymen penetrate Asian markets. Once aware of them, Europeans 
actively attempted to change or circumvent these local norms of shipwreck. At first this was largely 
done through bilateral treaties with local rulers. In exchange for increased European business, rulers 
were willing tomake concessions on thereturn of shipwrecked property and the repatriation of 
survivors.18As power balances shifted in their favour, European powers became more aggressive in 
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enforcing their norms with gunboats and punitive expeditions. This was even performed by 
individuals. Sir James Brooke, for instance, not only equipped a private warship to suppress piracy 
and protect shipwrecked sailors in the Malayan archipelago but even ended up establishing himself 
as the Raja of Sarawak in the process.19Overall, this process of learning, adapting to, and ultimately 
subverting/replacing indigenous shipwreck norms would be repeated in East Asia in the nineteenth 
century.  
Nineteenth Century Shipwreck Norms 
 Although the admitted how their ancestors had not always treated the victims of 
shipwreckkindly, for Europeans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centurythis had become 
an important indicator of civilized behavior. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the correct 
treatment of strangers in distress was seen as a key component of state legitimacy.20In other words, 
countries that did not care for shipwrecked sailors were judged to be outside the civilized pale. As 
the nineteenth century progressed, of course, this yardstick of civilization was increasingly loaded 
with more ideological baggage, including ideas of technological development and 
race.21Nevertheless, the correct treatment of shipwrecked sailors had a powerful legitimizing effect 
in Westerners’ minds, one that was capable of transcending differences in race or material culture.22
  
In practical terms, this meant that castaways had to be rescued, treated respectfully, and 
their property salvaged. An article written by Dr. Fothergill praising the shipwreck asylum at Bambury 
Castle in Northumberland, England, gives a good indication of contemporary views on dealing with 
shipwrecks. This facility had a signal gun to alert the authorities when ships were in distress, sent 
horsemen to patrol the beach during storms, had full-time observers in the winter, and was equipped 
with beds and provisions to care for survivors. It also had spare equipment for damaged ships and 
storage areas for salvaged cargo. Even bodies washed on shore would be buried for free.23Of course, 
these ideas were not always implemented. Even domestic shipwrecks sometimes saw grievous 
breakdowns of order and discipline, as was seen on December 26, 1804, when a ship loaded with 
sugar and coffee broke up in Plymouth harbor during a storm. Soldiers were forced to fire live 
ammunition to keep local inhabitants from looting the wreckage.24Nevertheless, the strength of 
these shipwreck norms cannot be denied.For example, following the 1782 wreck of the English 
merchant ship Grosvenor the Dutch authorities at Cape Town immediately organized search and 
rescue missions, even though the two countries were at war.25Just before the outbreak of the 
Crimean War, with tensions with England at their height, the Russian Admiral Putiatin still felt 
justified in putting hissquadron in danger by stopping to help a British merchant ship that had run 
aground on a reef near Napa, in the Ryukyu islands.26 
 In East Asia, meanwhile, there was a different set of practices built around different 
assumptions. Valuable research has been done on the reparation of castaway sailors between Japan, 
China, Korea, and the Ryukyu islands. Bureaucratic records indicate the scope of the problem. From 
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1599 to 1888 there were over ten thousand Koreans who drifted to Japan.27The numbers going the 
other way were considerably lower, perhaps because of the wind and currents. Between 1618 and 
1872 there are 1235 Japanese individuals known to have been castaway on the shores of 
Korea.28That these international shipwrecks can be viewed as a problem in international relations is 
indicated by the reports of communication breakdowns, disturbances, and violence sometimes 
occurring between Korean castaways and their Japanese escorts.29 It appears that these countries, 
despite their exclusionary policies, had bureaucratic mechanisms in place to deal with shipwrecked 
sailors: “From the beginning of the modern era there existed, though loosely, a system of 
repatriation among East Asian countries, including Choson, Japan, China, and Ryukyu, that did not 
entail compensation, though there were regional differences.”30In other words, the political 
challenges and opportunities posed by shipwrecked foreign nationals were constrained by 
bureaucratic institutions and a shared body of practices. 
 The fact that the East Asian castaway repatriation system was embedded in pre-existing 
tributary and trading relationships was problematic. For Western countriesthat were not permitted 
to join these trading or diplomatic relationships, it meant that East Asian mechanisms for the 
repatriation of castaways were never fully implemented. In addition, European castaways 
wereperceived as a more serious security threat than castaways from other Asian countries. Hamel 
and his colleagues were not allowed to leave Korea in 1653for fear that they would tell other 
countries about the kingdom.31Aizawa Seishisai, writing in 1825, believed English sailors were Russian 
spies who “draw maps and sketch our terrain.”32Likewise, Chinese officials often worried about 
shipwrecked Europeans being pirates.33This overriding concern with security led to tensions with 
Western countries over the question of physical detainment of castaways. In 1852, for instance, the 
New York Times published a story detailing how American castaways in Japan were imprisoned, 
forced to step on the cross, deprived of food, and treated like wild beasts. One of them was even 
beaten to death.34A sticking point in Perry’s negotiations with the Japanese was whether or not 
castaways could be physically restrained. The Japanese cited security concerns but the Perry refused 
to countenance the practice.35Article IV of the resulting treaty was explicit that “those shipwrecked 
persons…shall be free as in other countries, and not subjected to confinement.”36 
Yet, for the most part, it seems that shipwrecked sailors from Europe and the United States 
were still successfully repatriated through tributary or trade networks. In China, shipwrecked 
foreigners were sent to the trading port of Canton and from there to Macao. This happened in 1598 
when 120 Spanish sailors and soldiers were shipwrecked on the Chinese coast.37It was still happening 
in 1819 when the British-owned Friendship ran aground on Hainan Island.38In Japan, castaways were 
usually sent to Nagasaki, such as the seven American sailors repatriated in 1849.39In Korea, they were 
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usually forwarded on to China through the northern frontier, like the crew of the American schooner 
Surprise in 1866 or the four deserters from the Two Brothers whaling ship that ended up being blown 
by a storm into East Korea Bay in 1855.40In 1801, however, it appears that Chinese authorities 
refused to accept a party of four Portuguese castaways and they were returned to Korea to an 
unknown fate.41There is evidence for repatriations through Tsushima to Nagasaki as well, such as the 
Dutch survivors of the Sperwer.42Overall, the East Asian repatriation system actually showed 
considerable flexibility in dealing with the problem of shipwrecked Westerners.  
The real root of the problem was the ideological gulf separating the two approaches to 
castaways. European concern for the ‘civilized’ treatment and repatriation of castaways (and their 
property) was the tip of an iceberg that included hydrographic surveys, the establishment of pilot 
systems, navigational buoys, and light houses. This whole bundle of Western practices and norms 
were aimed at making navigation simple, safe, and ultimately inexpensive. But safe navigation was 
not simply a matter of saving money or lives—it represented the progress of civilization. This thinking 
can be found quite early in European thought. In the Seamans Secrets, a treatise on navigation 
written in 1607 by John Davis, intercontinental voyages are praised as mutually beneficial and 
natural.43The preface of Broughton’s A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, despite being 
published almost two hundred years after John Davis, echoes him to a striking degree by arguing that 
voyages served to “promote a further knowledge of the globe, to soften the ferocity of our 
unenlightened fellow creatures, enlarge the intercourse of mankind, and bind together the remotest 
nations by the connections of commerce.”44The Americans bought into this idea as well. Commodore 
Perry and other prominent figures in Washington strongly believed that commerce and civilization 
were directly linked.45 
If facilitating commerce through the protection of castaways was praised by European 
writers, a nation that did not allow its coastal waters to be surveyed, mistreated castaways, and 
turned away ships in distress was shrinking its civilized duty. But what about countries such as China, 
Korea, and Japan that repatriated castaways but did so in a manner that restricted outside contact? 
Notice the negative tone of the following commentary: 
The case of the gentleman, [the supercargo of the Friendship who kept a journal during his 
repatriation through Canton in 1820], is not a solitary one: others of the same kind could be 
enumerated, when persons who landed on the coast under similar misfortune, have been 
treated precisely in the same manner, the whole expence of travelling to Canton being, 
invariably, defrayed by the government. On the same principle they will not allow of 
intercourse with foreign nations, even their immediate neighbours, as far as has been as yet 
ascertained, except in the ports of Macao or Canton, and here their commerce is carried on 
with Europeans ostensibly, as if it were a favour conferred, and not as if the mutual benefits 
of trade were exchanged.46 
On one hand, it is possible to look at this incident as an example of how effective and benevolent the 
Chinese repatriation system was. After all, the survivors were saved, fed, and ultimately returned to 
their countrymen free of charge. However, for the English the moral of the story was different. For 
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